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Abstract  
 
This paper provides estimates of price-marginal cost ratios for manufacturing and 
services sectors in the Eurozone, the US and Japan over the period 1970-2007. The 
estimates are obtained applying τhe methodology developed by Hall (1988) and 
extended by Roeger (1995) on the EU KLEMS March 2011 database. The major 
stylized facts that are emerged from the empirical results based on the Ordinary Least 
Squares, Two Step Least Squares and Bootstrap methods of estimation are a) there is 
no evidence of imperfect competition across the majority of industries in Eurozone, 
US and Japan, b) sectors that are more open to internationalisation, experience 
relatively lower mark up ratios than the ratios experienced in less open sectors to 
internationalisation and c) deregulated industries generally have lower mark – up 
ratios than regulated industries, while fragmented industries generally exhibit higher 
mark – up ratios than segmented ones. 
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1.  Introduction  
 
Estimating the degree of competition in an industry is crucial for regulatory and 
competition authorities as well as the policy-makers. Regulators would like to know 
whether current regulation is conducive to competition. Likewise, competition 
authorities might gauge the current competitive situation in a sector (Christopoulou 
and Vermeulen, 2012).  
 
As a consequence, boosting competition in the markets for goods and services is a 
growing economic policy concern, as evidenced by the policies employed by the 
European Commission and the OECD. Specifically, the European Commission, has 
recently announced its intention to amend the competition law legislation by fine 
tuning certain regulatory measures (i.e EC merger regulation, leniency program, 
application of State aid rules, etc) in order to facilitate competitive conditions across 
the member states.  
  
It is noteworthy, that competition, inter alia, enhances economic activity and 
increases the level of employment by improving purchasing power and spurring firms 
to innovate. In this context, there is a need for structural indicators allowing the 
researchers and the government officials to identify clearly those sectors of the 
economy for which competition could be increased. Among the most commonly used 
indicators are the degree of market concentration in the sector, such as HHI and CR 4  
indexes, and the degree of sectoral regulation. However, these indicators do not 
always reflect the real degree of competition in a sector (Trėsor-Economics, 2008).  
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An alternative approach is to use national accounts data to infer conclusions about the 
difference between the selling price (P) and the marginal cost (MC), since the less 
competition there is in a sector, the more the price can diverge from the marginal 
production cost. In other words, we can use the ratio between the sale price and the 
marginal production cost (mark up ratio) in order to gauge the intensity of 
competition in a sector. As a consequence, mark-up estimates of different sectors and 
different countries allowing for comparisons of the degree of competition, they should 
help in identifying which sectors and/or countries would benefit most from changes in 
legislation or regulation that affect competition.   
 
The approach adopted here is to estimate econometrically the level of market power 
by following the methodology developed by Hall (1988) and extended by Roeger 
(1995). This methodology is based on the hypothesis that in a situation of perfect 
competition the selling price is equal to marginal cost. The equality of marginal cost 
and price is essential for the efficiency of the economy since, first, competitive 
markets can achieve higher productivity levels, and second, competition provides 
consumers with products of higher quality, increased variety and lower prices (Rezitis 
and Kalantzi, 2013). However, this condition does not apply in a less competitive 
environment (i.e oligopoly markets, monopolies), since the price deviates from 
marginal cost. Therefore, the ratio between the selling price and marginal cost 
assesses the competitiveness of the market. However, while selling price is directly 
observable, the marginal production cost is not. This drawback was overcome by Hall 
(1988) and Roeger (1995) who both showed that under perfect competition, the 
nominal growth rate of the Solow residual is independent of the nominal capital 
productivity growth rate. It then follows that the coefficient linking the nominal 
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growth rate of the Solow residual to the nominal capital productivity growth is the 
Lerner Index defined as the ratio of the price minus marginal cost to price 
(
P
MCP
L

 ).  
 
Despite the voluminous amount of work on the topic, none of these studies –to the 
best of our knowledge- has examined this relationship for the Eurozone countries.3 
Furthermore, unlike previous studies, we use an array of econometric techniques 
(OLS, 2SLS and bootstrap methods) to test the robustness of the results. The scope of 
this paper is that its empirical findings might be used as a benchmark to other 
European countries in order to asses the degree of competition in certain 
manufacturing and services sectors.   
 
In this paper, we empirically investigate the market power of the Eurozone, the US 
and Japan, manufacturing and services industry at a disaggregated level. In particular, 
the empirical model assesses the extent of the mark - up ratio for each of the sub-
sectors of the two industries over the period 1970–2007. The remainder of this paper 
is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature, while Section 3 discusses the 
data and outlines the methodology applied. Section 4 illustrates and evaluates the 
results of the empirical analysis, while Section 5 depicts some stylized facts. Finally, 
Section 6 provides some conclusions and policy implications.   
  
 
 
                                                 
3 For the purposes of this paper the Eurozone consists of the following countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.  
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2.  Survey of the literature  
 
The estimation of the market power has been of interest to economists for a long time 
and there is a substantial body of literature assessing the main elements of 
competition in various countries and industries. In principle, there are two different 
methodological approaches in assessing the level of market power. The first is a 
reduced form method proposed by Hall (1988) and extended by Roeger (1995) 
estimating the average Lerner index and the mark up ratio by relaxing the assumption 
of perfect competition. The second approach consists of the estimation of supply and 
demand relations, and can be complemented with input demand functions (Bresnahan, 
1982). In other words, it aims at estimating marginal cost and in addition to the Lerner 
index, it incorporates the elasticity of demand and the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index 
as parameters to be estimated.  
 
Based on the above, the majority of these studies apply Roeger (1995) methodology 
in order to estimate industry markups (see Table 1). Most of these studies consent that 
mark up ratios exceed unity denoting the absence of competitive conditions in certain 
sectors/industries (see for example Martins et al, 1996; Christopoulou and Vermeulen, 
2012; Molnar, 2010; Molnar and Bottini, 2010). This finding constitutes a major 
hypothesis that is empirically tested by using different econometric techniques, such 
as panel data methods (fixed, random effects) or cross-section analysis, in order to 
asses the level of competitive conditions in an industry. 
  
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
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Considering the above, Martins et al, (1996) apply the Roeger (1995) approach 
extended to include intermediate goods, in order to estimate markups in the 
manufacturing industries for 14 OECD countries, over the period 1970-1992 by using 
the OECD STAN database. According to their findings, the estimated mark-ups are 
positive and statistically significant in all of the countries considered. The level of 
mark-ups appears to be related to the market structure of a particular industry, while 
there is a considerable variation of mark-ups across countries and across industries. 
Wu (2009) uses the data from Martins et al. (1996) and finds insignificant effects of 
entry barriers on mark – up ratios. Especially, the author infers that mark – up ratios 
are high with high entry regulated countries and sectors with entry natural barriers. 
Weiss (2010) explores 299 4-digit US manufacturing industries for the period 1961 – 
1989 and finds that mark – up ratios are significantly higher in concentrated and 
capital intensive industries with high growth rates and advertising to sales ratio. Also, 
he doesn’t find significant differences in mark – up ratios over the business cycle. 
 
Martins and Scarpetta (1999) estimate price mark – up ratios for a set of US 
manufacturing industries as well as in France, Germany, Japan, US and UK from 
1970 to 1992. The authors define margins over gross output instead of value added 
and conclude that the estimated mark – up ratios in US manufacturing are in the range 
of 10 – 15 per cent, while they tend to be higher in the other countries under scrutiny 
within a range of 15 – 30 per cent. 
 
Christopoulou and Vermeulen, (2012), employ the same methodology in order to 
provide estimates of price-marginal cost ratios or mark-ups for 50 sectors in eight 
euro area countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria 
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and Finland) and the US. The data are taken from the EU KLEMS database and cover 
the period 1981-2004. This study concurs with the perception that perfect competition 
can be rejected for all sectors in all the examined countries, since the relevant mark-
up ratios exceed unity. Furthermore, average markups are heterogenous across 
countries and sectors, with services having higher markups on average than 
manufacturing. Lastly, services sectors depict higher markups in the euro area than 
the US, whereas the pattern is the reverse for manufacturing. Lastly, there is sufficient 
evidence that the magnitude of the markups does not significantly change when 
splitting the time span.   
 
In a similar study (Molnar, 2010), mark-up ratios are estimated using Roeger (1995) 
methodology for manufacturing and service industries in Slovenia at a sectoral 
disaggregated level. The estimation is performed for the period 1993-2006 and uses 
firm level data of the Amadeus database. The empirical findings consent that the 
estimated mark-ups are higher for services than manufacturing industries. The same 
results hold in the empirical study of Molnar and Bottini, (2010). In this paper, mark-
ups are estimated for the services industries in European OECD countries for the 
period 1993-2006 of the Amadeus Database. In general, the estimated mark-ups are 
higher for professional services, real estate, renting and utilities, while they tend to be 
substantially lower for construction, computer services, retail and wholesale trade and 
catering. There is also large variation across countries in terms of the sizes of the 
estimated mark-ups. Competitive pressures according to these markups should be 
large in the United Kingdom and most Scandinavian countries, and relatively small in 
Central European countries, Sweden and Italy.  
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Rezitis and Kalantzi (2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2013) investigate the market structure of 
the Greek manufacturing industry at the two-digit SIC level. These studies extend the 
Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995) approach, in order to evaluate the degree of market 
power in the Greek manufacturing industries (e.g food and beverages).   They consent 
that there is significant market power in the sectors under scrutiny.  
 
On the contrary, Nishimura et al. (1999), implied to a panel of 21 Japanese industries 
over the period 1971-1994 an alternative method based on the identity between the 
short-run elasticity of output to inputs, the mark-up ratio, and the factor shares. They 
argue that, there is a strong evidence of imperfect competition, where internationally 
competitive industries show low mark-ups. Moreover, they conclude that the mark-up 
rate differs considerably among firms and its distribution is skewed, while the mark-
up rate over marginal cost shows strong procyclicality.4    
 
Maioli (2004) calculates markups for 30 French manufacturing industries over the 
period 1977-1997 according to two different methodologies. The first is based on the 
classical Solow residual approach, as adapted by Roeger (1995), while the second 
jointly estimates mark ups and returns to scale. The results reveal the absence of 
competitive conditions since the mark up ratios are generally larger than one in both 
methodologies, while there is heterogeneity in the magnitude of the ratios across the 
manufacturing sectors. 
 
Polemis, (2014) investigated the level of market power in the Greek manufacturing 
and services industry over the period 1970-2007. The empirical results indicate that 
                                                 
4 Further evidence regarding mark – up ratios in Japan can be found in Martins & Scarpetta (1999).  
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the Greek manufacturing and services industries operate in non-competitive 
conditions. Moreover, average mark-up ratios are heterogenous across sectors, with 
manufacturing having higher mark ups on average than services. In contrast to other 
related studies, we provide sufficient evidence about the movements of mark up ratios 
over time. According to our findings, the mark up ratios in the manufacturing sectors 
are on average higher in the post European Union (EU) accession period (1982-1992), 
as a result of the merger wave in the manufacturing industry. However, this upward 
trend stopped within the period (1993-2007), and the relevant ratios have decreased 
substantially.        
 
Summarizing, the major stylized facts that are emerged from this paper are a) there is 
no evidence of imperfect competition across the majority of industries in Eurozone, 
US and Japan, b) sectors that are more open to internationalisation, experience 
relatively lower mark up ratios than the ratios experienced in less open sectors to 
internationalisation and c) deregulated industries generally have lower mark – up 
ratios than regulated industries, while fragmented industries generally exhibit higher 
mark – up ratios than segmented ones.5    
 
3.  Data and Methodology  
 
The approach used in this paper is based on a methodology developed by Hall (1988) 
and extended by Roeger (1995). The basic insight is that the traditional Solow 
residual (SR) should be independent of variation in the log-change of output in the 
absence of monopoly power. The main contribution of Roeger (1995) is that he 
                                                 
5 Evidence of estimated mark – up ratios using firm level data may be found in Konings et al. (2005), 
Konings and Vandenbussche (2005) and Görg and Warzynski (2006).  
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showed how the differences between the production-based (primal) Solow residual 
(SR) and the cost based (dual) Solow residual (DSR) can be used to eliminate the 
unobservable productivity shock in order to obtain an unbiased estimate of market 
power (Rezitis and Kalantzi, 2012b).  
 
Assume that the production function which is homogenous of degree λ (returns to 
scale) is defined by the following neoclassical equation:   
 
),,( KMLAfY            (1) 
 
where Y is gross output, A is the multifactor productivity growth (Hicks-neutral 
productivity term) and there are three basic inputs in the production process. More 
specifically, L denotes labour, M is the intermediate inputs, and K stands for capital. 
The inclusion of intermediate inputs allows defining the mark-up ratios using gross 
output, and hence overcoming the upward bias that would result if value added were 
used instead (Martins et al, 1996; Molnar and Bottini, 2010). After log-differentiation 
and re-arranging we get the following equation: 
 
)1()( LkyLkamalaySR kmL        (2) 
 
where SR is the (primal) Solow residual, y, l, m and k are the first differences of the 
logs of KMLY ,, , respectively, ia  is the input share of factor i and L now is the 
Lerner index6, which relates the mark -up ratio μ:7  
                                                 
6 The index ranges from 1 to 0, with higher numbers implying greater market power. For a perfectly 
competitive firm (where P = MC), L= 0. Alternatively, the Lerner index describes the relationship 
between elasticity and price margins for a profit-maximizing firm. 
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
1
1


P
MCP
L           (3) 
 
From the equation 3 it is evident that the mark up ratio μ can be computed 
as
L

1
1
 .8  Under perfect competition (L=0) the Solow residual is identical to the 
rate of technical progress (θ). Equation (2) becomes  
 
 kamalaySR kmL                                                                                      (2΄) 
 
Roeger (1995) showed that an equivalent expression can be derived for the dual 
productivity measure (price-based Solow residual) by using the cost function 
associated with the production function (equation 1) as follows:9 
 
)()1( rpLLprapawaSRP KmML                    (4) 
 
where w denotes the wages, pm is the price of intermediate inputs, r is the rental price 
of capital and p is the price of output. By subtracting (4) from (2) and assuming 
constant returns to scale (λ=1), a suitable expression of L can be obtained by the 
following interpretation:  
 
)]()[())(1()()()( rkypLkraampalwayp MLmML               (5) 
                                                                                                                                            
7 The lower case indicates log-differentiation. 
8 Due to lack of data regarding (net indirect) taxes and value added rates across industries and countries 
under scrutiny the estimation of mark – up ratio is possibly upward bias.  
9 Under perfect competition equation (4) becomes  prapawaSRP KmML .  
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For the sake of simplicity the above equation can be re-written after adding a 
disturbance term (ε) as follows:10  
 
 xLy            (6) 
 
where 
 
))(1()()()( kraampalwaypy MLmML                                       (7) 
)()( rkypx                                                                                                    (8) 
 
are the nominal Solow residual (Δy) and the growth rate of the nominal output/capital 
ratio (Δx) correspondingly.  
 
In equation 8 k is the capital compensation at basic current prices and r is the user 
(rental) cost of capital. Capital compensation is derived as the value added minus 
labour compensation, which in turns is derived by applying the ratio of hours worked 
by total persons engaged to hours worked by employees to compensation. Since the 
database does not contain a price series for capital we have to construct it, by 
following the Hall and Jorgensen (1967) approach. Therefore, the rental price of 
capital r can be computed by the following equation:   
 
   ie Pir              (9)  
 
                                                 
10 Essentially,      xLy 11* . Under constant returns to scale (λ=1),  xLy . 
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where Pi is the fixed asset investment deflator, (i-πe) denotes the real interest rate, and 
δ is the depreciation rate, which is set at 5% across all sectors (Martins et al, 1996). In 
other words, real interest rate is the long-term interest rate minus the expected 
inflation rate, which in turn is the filtered inflation rate. For Pi we use the fixed capital 
deflator for the total economy since sector specific deflators were not available for the 
sample countries, (i-πe) is the real interest rate, both taken from the AMECO database. 
It is worth mentioning that different error terms are assumed for the sector-based 
estimation of mark-ups. As the unobservable productivity term, a cancels out with this 
subtraction, equation (6) is relatively easy to estimate by applying econometric 
techniques. The estimation of equation (2), in contrast, would result in bias and 
inconsistency of the mark-up estimates as the input variables are correlated with the 
productivity shocks (Molnar and Bottini, 2010). 
 
In order to perform an in depth investigation of industry competitiveness in the 
sample countries (Eurozone, Japan and the US), we use an extended dataset for 
manufacturing and services sectors at the two and four digit level (ISIC Rev. 3 
classification) covering the period 1970-2007. The data are taken from the EU 
KLEMS 2011 database. The interpretation of the variables which are expressed in 
their natural logarithms comes as follows: y and p denote the gross output volume and 
price indices respectively (1995=100). w measures the compensation of employees 
(million of Euros) and M and pm denote the intermediate inputs indices for volume 
and price respectively (1995=100). Mark-up ratios are estimated by directly 
computing the relevant input shares (coefficients αl and am). This method relies on 
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computation of the revenue shares of factor inputs instead of econometric estimation 
of the production function11.  
 
4.  Empirical results  
 
In this section we present the empirical findings of the estimation of mark - up ratios 
in manufacturing and services sectors in the sample countries (Eurozone, Japan and 
the US) over the estimated period (1970–2007).  
 
The empirical results of the OLS estimation of equation 6 regarding Eurozone are 
shown in Table 2. According to the empirical findings, the estimated mark -up 
coefficients are on average statistically significant at any conventional level of 
significance. Besides, the F-statistics support the jointly statistical significance of the 
estimated regressions, while the error terms are not correlated over time (lack of 
autocorrelation). Regarding the magnitude of the relevant estimates, there is 
significant variation but the most of the mark -up ratios are below unity, implying the 
presence of competitive conditions for the manufacturing and services industry in the 
Eurozone over the period 1970─2007. It is worth mentioning that the magnitude of 
the estimations does not vary significantly from the ones reported by the bootstrap12 
and 2SLS methods (23 out of 29 estimations of mark –up ratios are below unity with 
the 3 methods) implying that the results are quite robust. In other words, the bootstrap 
                                                 
11 It is noteworthy that the alternative method of computing the input factor shares by estimating the 
elasticities of the production function has severe problems concerning the biasness of the relevant 
coefficients (Basanetti et al, 2008). 
12 Bootstrap method involves estimating a model many times using simulated data. Quantities 
computed from the simulated data are then used to make inferences from the actual data. The 
estimation of the bootstrap method provides more accurate estimates of the Lerner indices and the 
mark-up ratios.   
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estimator reveals that the OLS findings are robust to any simultaneity bias between 
the control variables and the error terms.  
 
Regarding the manufacturing sectors (15 to 37 two & four digit-codes), the mark-up 
ratios range from 0.53 (Textile, Leather and Footwear) to 1.05 (Transport equipment). 
This range differs from the high mark-ups obtained in previous studies for European 
countries (Martins et al, 1996; Molnar and Bottini, 2010; Christopoulou and 
Vermeulen, 2012; Rezitis and Kalantzi, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2013 and Polemis, 
2014). Especially, Christopoulou and Vermeulen, (2012) report that in the Euro area 
(Germany, France Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Finland) the 
statistical significant estimated weighted average mark – up ratio is 1.37.13 One 
explanation for this discrepancy is due to the adjustment for intermediate inputs. This 
adjustment tends to lower mark-ups substantially, in particular for sectors with a large 
share of intermediate input in total output (i.e rubber and plastics, pulp, paper, 
printing and publishing, etc).  
 
On average, mark-up ratios in Eurozone industries appear particularly low in 
comparison with other OECD countries (Molnár, 2010; Christopoulou and 
Vermeulen, 2012; Maioli, 2004) but the average reveals differences across sectors 
(heterogeneity). This is not surprising given that on the one hand, sector specific 
characteristics affect the mark-up companies’ pricing behaviour (prices above average 
costs), while on the other hand, the regulatory barriers (i.e legalities) vary 
considerably across sectors distorting the level of competition.  
 
                                                 
13  
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<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
In Eurozone, the statistical significant at 5% level of mark up ratio in food, beverages 
and Tobacco industries (code 15t16) which accounts for large portion of the total 
gross output in manufacturing is below unity (0.94). This outcome contradicts with 
previous studies regarding independent European countries (Molnár, 2010; Polemis, 
2014), and indicates no evidence of market power in the specific sectors. 
Christopoulou and Vermeulen, (2012) state that in the Euro area the weighted average 
mark – up ratio in the said industries is 1.12 and 1.34 in Food and Beverage and 
Tobacco sectors respectively. In textile, leather and footwear industry (code 17t19) 
the estimated mark – up ratio (0.53) is even lower than in the aforementioned 
industries indicating an even more competitive environment in them. Lastly, transport 
equipment (34t35) and manufacturing, nec, recycling (36t37) industries are the only 
industries in manufacture sector in the Eurozone in which the estimated mark – up 
ratios exceed unity (1.05 & 10.1 respectively). However, the results are close to unity, 
except from the estimated mark – up ratios employed by Bootstrap and 2SLS methods 
in manufacturing, nec, recycling and transport equipment industries, showing modest 
pressures on competition.      
 
Mark-ups are also below unity in some tradable services industries, such as electricity, 
gas & water supply (0.94), construction (0.82), financial intermediation (0.95), public 
administration and defence, compulsory social security (0.99), education (0.75) and 
health & social work (0.89). On the contrary, the estimated mark – up ratios exceed 
unity in hotel and restaurants (1.11), community, social and personal services (1.08) 
and other community, social and personal services (1.01) industries.  
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In the services industry (two & four digit codes from 50 to 74) the mark-up ratios 
range from 0.70 (OLS estimation in transport and storage industry) or 0.58 (2SLS 
estimations in Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail 
sale of fuel - Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of 
household goods industries) to 0.99 (OLS estimation Post and telecommunications) or 
1.64 (Bootstrap estimations in Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 
repair of household goods). Even thought transport and storage communication 
constitute networks industries, where in general, exhibit higher mark-ups than 
competitive non-network sectors owing to the large sunk and fixed costs (Molnár, 
2010), the estimated mark – up ratio is the lowest in services industry indicating no 
evidence of market power.  
 
On the other hand, mark-ups are close to unity in highly traded services such as sale, 
maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of fuel (0.98 
OLS estimation) as well as in Post and telecommunications, Real estate activities and 
Renting of machinery & equipment and other business activities. These findings are 
supported by Christopoulou and Vermeulen, (2012). Their empirical results show that 
the estimated weighted average mark – up ratios are among the highest mark – up 
ratios in the services industry in the Euro area. 
 
The empirical results of the OLS estimation of equation 6 regarding US are shown in 
Table 3. According to the empirical findings, the estimated mark -up coefficients are 
on average statistically significant at any conventional level of significance. Besides, 
the F-statistics support the jointly statistical significance of the estimated regressions, 
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while the error terms are not correlated over time (lack of autocorrelation). Regarding 
the magnitude of the relevant estimates, there is significant variation but the most of 
the mark -up ratios are below unity, implying the presence of competitive conditions 
for the manufacturing and services industry in the US over the period 1970─2007. It 
is worth mentioning that the magnitude of the estimations does not vary significantly 
from the ones reported by the bootstrap and 2SLS methods, 17 out of 30 estimations 
of mark –up ratios employed by the 3 methods of estimation are below unity, in 7 
sectors the estimated results employed by OLS & 2SLS methods coincide, in 4 sectors  
the estimated results employed by OLS & Bootstrap methods coincide and in 2 
sectors the results from the OLS estimation method differ from the corresponding 
results from 2SLS & Bootstrap methods of estimation. The above mentioned results 
imply that the empirical findings are quite robust, that is, the bootstrap estimator 
reveals that the OLS findings are robust to any simultaneity bias between the control 
variables and the error terms. 
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
Also, the findings do support that the majority of the sectors of the US manufacturing 
and services industries appears to operate under competitive characteristics for the 
period under consideration. The statistical significant mark up ratios employed by the 
three methods of estimation in food, beverages and Tobacco industries (code 15t16) 
which accounts for large portion of the total gross output in manufacturing is close to 
unity (0.97) with OLS estimation and above unity with Bootstrap & 2SLS methods of 
estimation (1.04 & 1.13 respectively). The estimated result from the OLS method of 
estimation is supported by Martins et al. (1996) and Martins and Scarpetta (1999) 
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regarding the Food products sector (1.05), while Christopoulou and Vermeulen, 
(2012) report an estimated mark – up ratio of 1.19 in Food & Beverages industry and 
1.51 in Tobacco industry. Roeger (1995) has also reported an estimated mark – up 
ratio of 1.50 in Food & Beverages industry, while the corresponding ratio in Tobacco 
industry is 2.75.14 The empirical results in food, beverages and Tobacco industries of 
this paper indicate modest pressures of completion and seem to contradict with the 
majority of the results of the previous studies.  
 
The only sectors in manufacturing industries in which the estimated mark – up ratios 
exceed unity are those of Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel (code 23), 
Chemicals and chemical products (code 24) and Manufacturing, nec, recycling (code 
36t37). These results are supported by the papers of Roeger (1995) and Christopoulou 
and Vermeulen, (2012). Overall, in this paper the mark-up ratios range from 0.82 and 
0.78 (OLS and Bootstrap estimations respectively in Basic metals and fabricated 
metal industry) or 0.60 (2SLS estimations in Textile, Leather and Footwear) to 1.16 
(OLS estimation in Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel) or 1.12 and 1.25 
(Bootstrap and 2SLS estimations in Pulp, paper, printing and publishing and 
Chemicals and chemical products respectively). In the manufacturing industry as a 
whole the resulted mark – up ratios are all below unity (they range from 0.85 to 0.97) 
revealing that the said industry in US behaves in a competitive manner.  
 
In the services industry (two & four digit codes from 50 to 74) the mark-up ratios 
range from 0.86 and 0.89 (OLS and 2SLS estimations in transport and storage 
industry respectively) or 0.85 (Bootstrap estimations in Wholesale trade and 
                                                 
14 The said estimated mark – up ratio is almost the same (2.77) by the work of Hall (1990).  
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commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles) to 0.99 (OLS estimation 
in Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of fuel) 
or 1.00 (2SLS estimations in Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles). The only sector in services industries in which the 
estimated mark – up ratio exceeds unity is this of Real estate activities (1.04). 
However, this result is supported only from Bootstrap method of estimation, while 
OLS and 2SLS methods of estimation provide quite robust results which are lower 
than unity (0.87 and 0.88 respectively).   
 
On the other hand, mark-ups are close to unity in highly traded services such as sale, 
maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of fuel (0.99 
OLS estimation), Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles (0.93 OLS estimation), in Renting of machinery & equipment and 
other business activities (0.94 OLS estimation) as well as Retail trade, except of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of household goods and Post and 
telecommunications (0.90 OLS estimations). These findings seem to contradict the 
empirical findings of Christopoulou and Vermeulen, (2012). Their empirical results 
show that the estimated mark – up ratios range from 1.19 (Retail trade, except of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles) to 2.98 (Renting of machinery & equipment). 
 
Mark-ups are also below unity in the majority of some other tradable services 
industries, such as electricity, gas & water supply (0.91), construction (0.95), Hotels 
and restaurants (0.99) and financial intermediation (0.92). However, the ratios exceed 
unity in education (1.03), health & social work (0.06) and other community, social 
and personal services (1.01) industries.  
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The empirical results of the OLS estimation of equation 6 regarding Japan are shown 
in Table 4. According to the empirical findings, the estimated mark -up coefficients 
are on average statistically significant at any conventional level of significance. 
Besides, the F-statistics support the jointly statistical significance of the estimated 
regressions, while the error terms are not correlated over time (lack of 
autocorrelation). Regarding the magnitude of the relevant estimates, there is 
significant variation but the majority of the mark -up ratios estimated by OLS and 
Bootstrap methods are below unity (18 out of 30 industries), implying the presence of 
competitive conditions for the manufacturing and services industry in the Japan over 
the period 1970─2007. It is worth mentioning that the magnitude of the estimations 
does not vary significantly from the ones reported by the bootstrap, 24 out of 30 
estimations of mark –up ratios employed by the 2 methods of estimation are moving 
in the same direction (below or above unity) The above mentioned results imply that 
the empirical findings are quite robust, that is, the bootstrap estimator reveals that the 
OLS findings are robust to any simultaneity bias between the control variables and the 
error terms. 
 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
Also, the findings do support that the majority of the sectors of the US manufacturing 
and services industries appears to operate under competitive characteristics for the 
period under consideration. The statistical significant mark up ratios employed by the 
OLS and Bootstrap methods of estimation in food, beverages and Tobacco industries 
(code 15t16) which accounts for large portion of the total gross output in 
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manufacturing is close to unity (0.93) with OLS estimation and below unity with 
Bootstrap method of estimation (0.74). The estimated results from both methods of 
estimation do not supported by Martins and Scarpetta (1999) regarding the Food 
products sector (1.32) and the Beverages sector (1.26). The empirical results in food, 
beverages and Tobacco industries of this paper indicate no evidence of market 
power.15  
 
The only sectors in manufacturing industries in which the estimated mark – up ratios 
exceed unity and the empirical results are robust, that is they employed by both OLS 
and Bootstrap methods of estimation, are those of Wood and of wood and cork (3.38 - 
code 23), Pulp, paper, printing  and publishing (2.31 - code 21t22) and Chemicals and 
chemical products (1.48 - code 24). These results are supported by the paper of 
Martins and Scarpetta (1999) and as it concerns Chemicals and chemical products 
industry by the paper of Nishimura et al., (1999). The Textile, Leather and Footwear 
industry (code 17t19) depicts the lowest mark – up ratio employed by OLS and 
Bootstrap methods of estimation in Japanese manufacturing sector (0.81 and 0.60 
respectively). 
 
In the services industry (two & four digit codes from 50 to 74) almost all the mark-up 
ratios rely below unity implying that there is no evidence of market power. They 
range from 0.88 (Renting of m&eq and other business activities – code 71t74) to 1.00 
(Transport and storage – 60t63). The only sector in services industries in which the 
estimated mark – up ratio exceeds unity is this of Real estate activities (2.15 and 1.23 
with OLS and Bootstrap estimators respectively – code 70).   
                                                 
15 Nishimura et al. (1999) report that in Food processing industry the estimated average mark – up ratio 
exceeds unty. 
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The majority of mark-ups are close but below unity in other tradable services 
industries, such as electricity, gas & water supply (0.90), Construction (0.90), Hotels 
and restaurants (0.72), Financial intermediation (0.97), Community, social and 
personal services (0.87), Other community, social and personal services (1.82) and 
Private households with employed persons (0.74). However, the ratios exceed unity in 
education (1.95) and health & social work (1.25) industries.  
 
5.  Stylized facts    
 
From the empirical findings of the previous section some stylized facts are emerged. 
A first stylized fact that may be derived is that there is no evidence of imperfect 
competition across the majority of industries in Eurozone, US and Japan. It is evident 
from Tables 2, 3 and 4 that the majority of the estimated mark – up ratios are 
statistically significant below unity. Table 5 categorizes the sectors in Eurozone, US 
and Japan into competitive and less competitive ones. 
 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
 
Table 5 reveals that almost 75% of the sectors under scrutiny across Eurozone, US 
and Japan are characterised as competitive and the remaining percentage (25%) are 
characterized as less competitive. In 18 sectors we cannot draw a final conclusion 
regarding the degree of competition on them since the empirical findings of Bootstrap 
method of estimation do not coincide with the corresponding findings of OLS and 
2SLS methods of estimation. 
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A second stylized fact that may be derived is that mark – up ratios are heterogeneous 
across industries with services having higher mark – up ratios than manufacturing 
industries. Interestingly, estimated mark – up ratios are higher in services industry 
than in manufacturing industry. In the Eurozone the statistically significant at 5 per 
cent level of significance estimated mark – up ratio in total manufacturing industry is 
0.88. The average mark – up ratio in services industry is 0.93 indicating that 
manufacturing industry is exposed more to competition than services industry. The 
same argument holds in US, the estimated mark – up ratio in total manufacturing 
industry is 0.94 and the average mark – up ratio in services industry is 0.96 as well as 
in Japan where the estimated mark – up ratio in total manufacturing industry is 0.99 
and the average mark – up ratio in services industry is 1.09.16  
 
A third stylized fact that may be derived is that mark – up ratios are heterogeneous 
across industries and countries. It is evident from tables 2, 3 and 4 and second 
stylized fact that the estimated mark – up ratios in manufacturing and services 
industries are higher than the corresponding ratios in US which in turn are higher than 
the corresponding ratios in Eurozone. Therefore, Eurozone exhibits the lowest mark – 
up ratios both in manufacturing and services industries. 
 
A fourth stylized fact that may be derived is that sectors that are more open to 
internationalisation, experience relatively lower mark up ratios than the ratios 
experienced in less open sectors to internationalisation. The textile sector is a 
interesting example. In Eurozone the estimated mark – up ratio is 0.53 while in Japan 
                                                 
16 The estimated mark – up ratios in total manufacturing is given by EU KLEMS March 2011 database, 
while the averages mark – up ratios in services industries across countries and Eurozone are calculated 
given the sectors under scrutiny in this paper.  
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is 0.81. These ratios are the lowest among the estimated mark – up ratios in 
manufacturing industry in Japan and Eurozone. In the US the estimated ratio is 0.90 
which is among the five lowest ratios in the manufacturing industry. Another 
interesting example is the Electrical and optical equipment sector in Eurozone and 
US. The estimated mark – up ratios in these two sectors are among the three and six 
lowest ratios in the manufacturing industry Eurozone and US respectively. 
 
A fifth stylized fact that may be derived is that deregulated industries generally have 
lower mark – up ratios than regulated industries, while fragmented industries 
generally exhibit higher mark – up ratios than segmented ones. In Table 2 the mark – 
up ratio in Post and telecommunications industry (code 64) is 0.99 (OLS estimation), 
1.14 (Bootstrap estimation) and 0.92 (2SLS estimation). These estimated mark – up 
ratios are close to unity and depict no competitive pressures in the specific industry. 
Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2012) have stated that the mark – up ratio in the same 
industry in the Euro area over the period 1980 – 2004 is 1.48, but this ratio may not 
reflect the deregulation mechanism that took place in that industry recently. Taking 
account the latter our estimation fully reflects the dynamics of deregulation in Post 
and telecommunications industry across major European countries (12) over the 
scrutinized period. In the US the corresponding ratios are lower than the ones reported 
in the Eurozone indicating that the deregulation mechanism that took place there 
earlier has stronger effects, in terms of competition, than in the Eurozone. 
 
 In addition, the mark – up ratio in Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel (code 23) 
ranges from 0.94 (OLS estimation) to 1.37 (Bootstrap estimation). The latter estimate 
clearly depicts the existence of major players in the wholesale oil market and the 
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possible fragmentation of that industry (Polemis and Fotis 2013; 2014, Martins and 
Scarpetta 1999). The same argument holds in the US, even though the magnitude of 
the estimated ratio is lower it is supported by the three methods of estimation, but the 
same cannot be argued in favour of the corresponding industry in Japan since the 
empirical findings are not robust.  
 
6.  Conclusions and policy implications    
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the level of market power of the manufacturing 
and services industries in Eurozone, US and Japan over the period 1970-2007. The 
empirical analysis was performed at a disaggregated level (two and four digit code), 
with the aim of investigating possible heterogeneity across different subsectors of the 
above industries. 
 
The empirical findings indicate that the majority of manufacturing and services 
industries operate in competitive conditions during the investigated period since the 
estimated mark up ratios are generally lower than unity in all of the specifications. 
Average mark-up ratios are heterogenous across sectors, with services having higher 
mark – up ratios on average than manufacturing. Also, mark – up ratios are 
heterogeneous across countries with Eurozone exhibiting the lowest mark – up ratios 
both in manufacturing and services industries among the scrutinized countries. The 
econometric results do not dramatically change when the Bootstrap and the 2SLS 
methods of estimation are applied implying the robustness of the results. 
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From the empirical findings it is evident that sectors that are more open to 
internationalisation such as textiles, experience relatively the lowest mark up ratios 
revealing no evidence of “collusion”. In order to enhance the level of 
internationalisation in the manufacturing sectors, the policy makers and the 
governments’ officials could pursue horizontal strategies focusing on the further 
opening of the markets.  
 
Furthermore, policy makers should enhance their policy in fragmented industries in 
which profitability indicators of market players may indicate evidence of imperfect 
competition. A further segmentation of such industries may increase the degree of 
competition in upstream oil markets around the world. 
 
To sum up, our analysis will be a useful policy tool to achieve structural micro-
economic goals in light of the existing financial crisis. Firstly, given the primarily 
indications regarding the high mark - up ratios in selected industries in manufacturing 
and services industries, a suitable ex ante policy is linked with a thorough 
investigation of mergers and acquisitions. Secondly, in order to enhance the level of 
internationalisation in manufacturing, the government could pursue horizontal 
strategies focusing on the further opening of the markets.  
 
Given the above considerations, our analysis can be further extended in order to tackle 
a number of constraints which may be addressed in future work. An analysis using 
more disaggregated firm level data may enrich our conclusions. Given the validity of 
the econometric results, the mark up ratios may be improved with the addition of new 
parameters especially those regarding price formulation. Furthermore, as more 
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information and data become available, especially at the firm level, and more 
companies enter the sample, more in-depth analysis should be made in order to 
examine aspects that are not covered by the existing database, since it may not collect 
information from all the new small entrants. Such a consideration will better capture 
the dynamism of the manufacturing and services industries and lead the research to 
further outcomes on developing a consumer policy.  
 
Finally, the methodology applied could be further refined, by estimating the input 
coefficients of the production function (shares) or by incorporating the role of returns 
to scale in the estimation of mark – up ratios. These are important issues and remain 
the subject of future research.  
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List of Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Main empirical studies estimating mark-up ratios.   
Study Country(ies)  Sectors Period  Methodology/Econometric 
technique  
Main Findings 
Martins et al, (1996) USA, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, United 
Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden. 
36 manufacturing 
sectors 
1970-1992 Roeger (1995) / OLS in time series  a) The estimated mark-ups are positive and statistically 
significant in all of the countries considered 
b) The level of mark-ups appears related to the market structure 
of a particular industry.  
c) There is a considerable variation of mark-ups across 
countries and across industries. 
Nishimura et al 
(1999)  
Japan 
21 manufacturing and 
service sectors 
1971-1994 
Elasticity method / Panel data 
techniques  
a) There is strong evidence of imperfect competition.  
b) The mark-up rate differs considerably among firms and its 
distribution is skewed.  
c) The mark-up rate over marginal cost shows strong  
procyclicality, and its sensitivity is uniform within the industry. 
Martins and 
Scarpetta (1999) 
Germany, France, Japan, United Kingdom, 
USA  
36 manufacturing 
sectors 
1970-1992 
Roeger (1995) – gross output / 
OLS in time series 
a) Mark – up ratios in USA manufacturing are in the range of 
10 – 15 per cent. 
b) Mark – up ratios tend to be higher in Germany, France, Japan 
and United Kingdom than in USA within a range of 15 – 30 per 
cent. 
Maioli (2004) France  
30 manufacturing and 
service sectors 
1977-1997 
a) Roeger (1995) / OLS in time 
series 
b) Lopez, et al. (2002) / nonlinear 
three stages least squares (N3SLS) 
a) The markup ratios are generally larger than one in both 
methodologies.  
b) Average markups are heterogenous across industries.  
Christopoulou and 
Vermeulen, (2012)  
USA, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, 
Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Finland.   
50 manufacturing and 
service sectors  
1981-2004 Roeger (1995) / OLS in time series  
a) The markup ratios are generally larger than one.  
b) Average markups are heterogenous across countries.  
c) Markups are heterogeneous across sectors, with services 
having higher markups on average than manufacturing.  
d) Services sectors generally have higher markups in the euro 
area than the US, whereas the pattern is the reverse for 
manufacturing.  
Molnar, (2010)  Slovenia.  37 manufacturing and 
service sectors 
1993-2006 Roeger (1995) / OLS in panel fixed 
effects  
a) The mark-ups are high in some industries, such as real estate 
and food and beverages.  
b) Mark-ups also appeared high in transport, catering and 
professional services,  
c) Mark-ups are lower for most manufacturing industries, traded 
services and other industries (i.e construction, computer 
services and retail and wholesale trade). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 30 
Table 1: Main empirical studies estimating mark-up ratios (continued).   
Study Country(ies)  Sectors Period  Methodology/Econometric 
technique  
Main Findings 
Molnar and Bottini, 
(2010)  
France, Germany, Italy, United 
Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovak Republic, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland.  
28 services sectors.   1993-2006 
Roeger (1995) / OLS in panel with 
and without fixed effects 
a) The mark-ups are higher for professional services, 
real estate, renting and utilities 
b) They are lower for construction, computer services, 
retail and wholesale trade and catering.  
c) There is also large variation across countries in terms 
of the sizes of the estimated mark-ups.  
d) Competitive pressures should be large in the United 
Kingdom and most Scandinavian countries, and 
relatively small in Central European countries, Sweden 
and Italy.  
Rezitis and Kalantzi 
(2011) 
Greece  Manufacturing sector   1984-2007 
Hall - Roeger (1995) / panel data 
techniques   
a) The whole Greek manufacturing industry, as well as 
each sector of the industry, operates in non-competitive 
conditions  
b) Labour intensity, the sector size, and the number of 
establishments influence the markup at the sectoral 
level.  
c) Labour intensity, growth and the number of 
establishments affect the markup over time. 
Rezitis and Kalantzi 
(2013) 
Greece  Manufacturing sector  1983-2007 Bresnahan 1989 / bootstrap method 
a) Each sector of the Greek manufacturing industry 
operate under imperfect competition, with the food and 
drink sector, the coke and refined sector and the 
communication equipment sector showing the highest 
degree of market power 
b) The transport equipment sector has the lowest degree 
of market power. 
c) There is a fluctuation in the degree of market power 
during the period 1983–1992.  
Polemis (2014)  Greece  
Manufacturing and 
services sector  
1970-2007  
Roeger (1995) / OLS, 2SLS and 
bootstap in panel with and without 
fixed effects 
a) The Greek manufacturing and services industries 
operate in non-competitive conditions.  
B) Average mark-up ratios are heterogenous across 
sectors, with manufacturing having higher mark ups on 
average than services.  
c) The mark up ratios in the manufacturing sectors are 
on average higher in the post European Union (EU) 
accession period (1982-1992), as a result of the merger 
wave in the manufacturing industry.  
d) This upward trend stopped within the period (1993-
2007), and the relevant ratios have decreased 
substantially. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration
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Table 2: Estimation of mark up ratios by sector in Eurozone, 1970-2007     
  OLS BOOTSTRAP 2SLS 
ISIC Sector Mark-up 
ratio 
Adjusted 
R2 
F-
statistic  
Mark-up 
ratio 
Adjusted 
R2 
Quasi-
LR stat 
Mark-up 
ratio 
Adjusted 
R2 
J-
Statistic 
D Total Manufacturing 0.88** 0.15 
4.15** 
[0.04] 
1.11* 0.05 
1.96 
[0.16] 
0.56* -0.93 
0.52 
[0.47] 
15t16 
Food, Beverages and 
Tobacco 
0.94** 0.27 
7.92* 
[0.01] 
1.00** 
 
0.13 
 
3.66*** 
[0.05] 
0.78* 0.12 
0.92 
[0.34] 
17t19 
Textile, Leather and 
Footwear 
0.53* -0.10 
0.47 
[0.53] 
0.52*** -0.19 - 0.50** -0.98 
1.00 
[0.32] 
20 
Wood and of wood 
and cork  
0.84** 0.14 
4.00*** 
[0.06] 
0.85*** 0.06 
2.09 
[0.15] 
0.88* 0.28 
0.13 
[0.72] 
21t22 
Pulp, paper, printing  
and publishing  
0.84*** 0.23 
7.31* 
[0.01] 
0.81** 0.13 
3.86** 
[0.05] 
0.50* -2.63 
0.00 
[0.99] 
23 
Coke, refined 
petroleum and nuclear 
fuel 
0.94* -0.13 
0.32 
[0.60] 
1.37* -0.11 - - - - 
24 
Chemicals and 
chemical products 
0.96* 0.45 
15.01* 
[0.00] 
1.14* 0.24 
5.43** 
[0.02] 
1.22** 0.51 
3.07*** 
[0.08] 
25 Rubber and plastics 0.91* 0.36 
14.04* 
[0.00] 
0.98* 0.16 
5.23** 
[0.02] 
0.90** 0.14 
2.73*** 
[0.10] 
26 
Other non-metallic 
mineral  
0.86* 0.43 
10.02* 
[0.01] 
0.79** 0.24 
3.85** 
[0.05] 
0.74* 0.86 
0.15 
[0.70] 
27t28 
Basic metals and 
fabricated metal  
0.96** 0.16 
4.46** 
[0.05] 
0.95** 0.03 
1.39 
[0.24] 
1.27*** 0.79 
5.79*** 
[0.02] 
29 Machinery, nec  0.85** 0.16 
5.89** 
[0.02] 
0.96* 0.01 
1.23 
[0.27] 
0.88*** 0.14 
6.56** 
[0.01] 
30t33 
Electrical and optical 
equipment  
0.86*** 0.25 
8.27* 
[0.01] 
0.98** 0.17 
5.40** 
[0.02] 
0.51* -1.05 
0.10 
[0.75] 
34t35 Transport equipment  1.05** 0.31 
9.66* 
[0.01] 
1.06*** 0.13 
3.79** 
[0.05] 
1.27** 0.31 
0.89 
[0.35] 
36t37 
Manufacturing, nec, 
recycling 
1.01* 0.10 
3.30*** 
[0.08] 
1.35** 0.18 
6.16** 
[0.01] 
- - - 
50 
Sale, maintenance and 
repair of motor 
vehicles and 
motorcycles; retail 
sale of fuel 
0.98* 0.18 
6.56** 
[0.02] 
0.91* 0.10 
3.73** 
[0.05] 
0.58** -0.50 
2.36 
[0.12] 
51 
Wholesale trade and 
commission trade, 
except of motor 
vehicles and 
motorcycles 
0.87* 0.24 
8.70* 
[0.01] 
0.84** 0.12 
0.02 
[0.04] 
0.58** -1.02 
0.02 
[0.87] 
52 
Retail trade, except of 
motor vehicles and 
motorcycles; repair of 
household goods 
0.91* -0.11 
0.02 
[0.89] 
1.64* -0.09 
0.13 
[0.71] 
0.93* 0.13 
0.15 
[0.69] 
60t63 Transport and storage  
0.70** -0.04 
0.00 
[0.98] 
0.83** -0.01 
0.70 
[0.40] 
0.58*** -0.25 
0.99 
[0.32] 
64 
Post and 
telecommunications  
0.99* 0.36 
14.33* 
[0.00] 
1.14* 0.16 
5.45* 
[0.02] 
0.92*** 0.45 
0.43 
[0.51] 
70 Real estate activities 
0.96* 0.41 
24.37* 
[0.00] 
0.95* 0.30 
17.02* 
[0.00] 
0.66* -0.33 
0.00 
[0.98] 
71t74 
Renting of machinery 
& equipment and 
other business 
activities 
0.98* 0.73 
85.54* 
[0.00] 
0.97*** 0.47 
30.70* 
[0.00] 
0.88* 0.61 
0.03 
[0.87] 
E 
Elecricity, Gas & 
Water Supply 
0.94** 0.36 
13.74* 
[0.00] 
0.85* 0.13 
4.64** 
[0.03] 
- - - 
F Construction  
0.82** 0.14 
4.67** 
[0.04] 
0.93* 0.10 
2.77*** 
[0.10] 
0.46* -2.32 
0.25 
[0.62] 
H Hotels and restaurants  
1.11* 0.26 
3.43 
[0.11] 
1.52** 0.10 
1.06 
[0.30] 
1.08** 0.38 
0.08 
[0.77] 
J 
Financial 
intermediation  
0.95* 0.05 
2.46 
[0.13] 
1.14* 0.05 
2.42 
[0.12] 
0.34** -1.80 
0.18 
[0.67] 
L 
Public administration 
and defence; 
compulsory social 
security  
0.99* 0.48 
31.97* 
[0.00] 
0.93* 0.21 
10.17* 
[0.00] 
0.36* -8.71 
0.37 
[0.55] 
LtQ 
Community, social 
and personal services  
1.08* 0.77 
114.37* 
[0.00] 
1.12** 0.55 
26.94* 
[0.00] 
0.48** -3.99 
0.04 
[0.85] 
M Education  0.75** -0.03 0.36 0.96** -0.01 0.86 0.65** -0.08 1.50 
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[0.56] [0.35] [0.22] 
N 
Health and social 
work  
0.89** 0.53 
37.76* 
[0.00] 
0.93** 0.29 
15.77* 
[0.00] 
0.85** 0.50 
0.26 
[0.61] 
O 
Other community, 
social and personal 
services  
1.01* 0.68 
69.88* 
[0.00] 
1.03*** 0.41 
24.35* 
[0.00] 
0.86** 0.55 
1.46 
[0.23] 
P 
Private households 
with employed 
persons 
- - - - - - - - - 
Figures in square brackets are the reported p-values. Significant at *1%, **5% and ***10% respectively. Lerner Indexes are 
available upon request. “-” indicates that no data were available or estimates are statistical insignificant. Standard errors were 
computed by the delta method. For all the 2SLS regressions the Instrument Rank is bigger than the slope coefficients of the 
regression included constant.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EU-KLEMS database. 
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Table 3: Estimation of mark up ratios by sector in USA, 1970-2007     
  OLS BOOTSTRAP 2SLS 
ISIC Sector Mark-up 
ratio 
Adjusted 
R2 
F-
statistic  
Mark-up 
ratio 
Adjusted 
R2 
Quasi-
LR stat 
Mark-up 
ratio 
Adjusted 
R2 
J-
Statistic 
D Total Manufacturing 0.94*** 0.83 
126.44* 
[0.00] 
0.97** 0.57 
34.86* 
[0.00] 
0.85* 0.75 
2.16 
[1.08] 
15t16 
Food, Beverages and 
Tobacco 
0.97*** 0.71 
 
42.20* 
[0.00] 
1.04* 0.49 
15.11* 
[0.00] 
1.13* 0.33 
0.28 
[0.09] 
17t19 
Textile, Leather and 
Footwear 
0.90** 0.46 
20.81* 
[0.00] 
1.04** 0.31 
11.41* 
[0.00] 
0.60*** 0.21 
0.38 
[0.93] 
20 
Wood and of wood 
and cork  
0.85* 0.77 
34.41 
[0.00] 
0.88* 0.48 
8.64* 
[0.00] 
0.64** 0.34 
0.04 
[0.62] 
21t22 
Pulp, paper, printing  
and publishing  
0.91*** 0.25 
5.89** 
[0.03] 
1.12** 0.20 
4.77** 
[0.03] 
0.61** 0.13 
0.05 
[0.93] 
23 
Coke, refined 
petroleum and nuclear 
fuel 
1.16* 0.78 
67.83 
[0.00] 
1.05** 0.59 
24.94* 
[0.00] 
1.09** 0.69 
0.15 
[0.38] 
24 
Chemicals and 
chemical products 
1.03* 0.02 
1.12 
[0.32] 
0.91** 0.10 
0.19 
[0.66] 
1.25*** 0.20 
0.16 
[0.45] 
25 Rubber and plastics 0.93** 0.46 
17.02 
[0.00] 
0.94* 0.25 
6.77* 
[0.00] 
0.82*** 0.25 
0.17 
[0.51] 
26 
Other non-metallic 
mineral  
1.00** 0.79 
74.20 
[0.00] 
0.92*** 0.53 
19.14* 
[0.00] 
1.02** 0.84 
1.27 
[0.95] 
27t28 
Basic metals and 
fabricated metal  
0.82** 0.49 
12.49 
[0.00] 
0.78* 
 
0.25 
4.69** 
[0.03] 
0.79** 0.38 
0.51 
[0.21] 
29 Machinery, nec  0.92* 0.23 
5.71** 
[0.03] 
0.82** 0.13 
3.56* 
[0.05] 
0.69* 0.13 
1.21 
[0.95] 
30t33 
Electrical and optical 
equipment  
0.84* 0.54 
18.47* 
[0.00] 
0.90* 
 
0.43 
14.93* 
[0.00] 
0.97* 0.90 
1.15 
[0.94] 
34t35 Transport equipment  0.85** 0.61 
22.80* 
[0.00] 
0.92** 
 
0.39 
9.33* 
[0.00] 
1.08* 0.82 
0.84 
[0.66] 
36t37 
Manufacturing, nec, 
recycling 
1.11* 0.69 
27.89* 
[0.00] 
1.03** 0.47 
9.68* 
[0.00] 
1.27** 0.65 
0.98 
[0.81] 
50 
Sale, maintenance and 
repair of motor 
vehicles and 
motorcycles; retail 
sale of fuel 
0.99** 0.61 
33.53* 
[0.00] 
0.93* 0.44 
16.86* 
[0.00] 
0.83** 
 
0.62 
0.74 
[0.11] 
51 
Wholesale trade and 
commission trade, 
except of motor 
vehicles and 
motorcycles 
0.93* 0.59 
26.47* 
[0.00] 
0.85** 0.29 
8.05* 
[0.00] 
1.00** 0.42 
1.85 
[0.47] 
52 
Retail trade, except of 
motor vehicles and 
motorcycles; repair of 
household goods 
0.90*** 0.57 
26.95* 
[0.00] 
0.90* 0.34 
10.15* 
[0.00] 
0.98** 0.53 
1.42 
[0.94] 
60t63 Transport and storage  
0.86* 0.66 
56.63* 
[0.00] 
0.91* 0.43 
27.40* 
[0.00] 
0.89** 
 
0.63 
4.47 
[1.98] 
64 
Post and 
telecommunications  
0.90* 0.70 
53.74* 
[0.00] 
0.98* 0.48 
20.45* 
[0.00] 
0.90* 0.64 
1.59 
[0.88] 
70 Real estate activities 
0.87* 0.66 
48.90* 
[0.00] 
1.04** 0.44 
20.44* 
[0.00] 
0.88** 
 
0.47 
0.42 
[0.26] 
71t74 
Renting of machinery 
& equipment and 
other business 
activities 
0.94* 0.58 
34.17* 
[0.00] 
0.95** 0.41 
16.65* 
[0.00] 
0.91** 0.75 
2.46 
[1.05] 
E 
Elecricity, Gas & 
Water Supply 
0.91* 0.83 
83.47* 
[0.00] 
0.97* 0.56 
22.16* 
[0.00] 
0.82*** 
 
0.13 
0.22 
[0.93] 
F Construction  
0.95** 0.32 
7.21* 
[0.00] 
0.95** 0.16 
3.12* 
[0.08] 
0.79* 0.28 
1.90 
[0.54] 
H Hotels and restaurants  
0.99* 0.52 
24.99* 
[0.00] 
0.80* 0.30 
9.50* 
[0.00] 
0.72* 0.22 
2.99 
[1.23] 
J 
Financial 
intermediation  
0.92* 0.72 
51.33* 
[0.00] 
0.95** 0.42 
15.45* 
[0.00] 
0.87** 0.68 
0.42 
[0.31] 
L 
Public administration 
and defence; 
compulsory social 
security  
0.86*** 0.94 
444.26* 
[0.00] 
1.07*** 0.77 
98.85* 
[0.00] 
0.99** 0.91 
5.38 
[1.68] 
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LtQ 
Community, social 
and personal services  
1.06** 0.78 
77.26* 
[0.00] 
0.89* 0.56 
27.86* 
[0.00] 
0.84* 0.72 
4.16 
[1.96] 
M Education  
1.03** 0.70 
67.30* 
[0.00] 
1.05** 0.56 
45.46* 
[0.00] 
0.84* 0.45 
1.40 
[0.31] 
N 
Health and social 
work  
1.06* 0.91 
303.18* 
[0.00] 
1.08* 0.72 
83.18* 
[0.00] 
0.97** 0.85 
2.21 
[1.08] 
O 
Other community, 
social and personal 
services  
1.01* 0.89 
234.52* 
[0.00] 
1.04* 0.70 
63.26* 
[0.00] 
0.92* 0.80 
2.10 
[1.54] 
P 
Private households 
with employed 
persons 
0.98** 0.77 
100.67* 
[0.00] 
1.01*** 0.57 
46.62* 
[0.00] 
0.95* 0.76 
1.54 
[0.98] 
Figures in square brackets are the reported p-values. Significant at *1%, **5% and ***10% respectively. Lerner Indexes are 
available upon request. “-” indicates that no data were available. .Standard errors were computed by the delta method. For all the 
2SLS regressions the Instrument Rank is bigger than the slope coefficients of the regression included constant.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EU-KLEMS database. 
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Table 4: Estimation of mark up ratios by sector in Japan, 1970-2007     
  OLS BOOTSTRAP 2SLS 
ISIC Sector Mark-up 
ratio 
Adjusted 
R2 
F-
statistic  
Mark-up 
ratio 
Adjusted 
R2 
Quasi-
LR stat 
Mark-up 
ratio 
Adjusted 
R2 
J-
Statistic 
D Total Manufacturing 0.99** 0.48 
21.43* 
[0.00] 
0.79*** 0.39 
17.38* 
[0.00] 
1.04* 0.54 
2.58 
[0.11] 
15t16 
Food, Beverages and 
Tobacco 
0.93*** 0.43 
13.24* 
[0.00] 
0.74** 
 
0.27 
 
8.38* 
[0.05] 
1.16** 0.34 
3.49*** 
[0.06] 
17t19 
Textile, Leather and 
Footwear 
0.81* 0.25 
5.11** 
[0.05] 
0.60* 0.10 
2.57 
[0.11] 
- - - 
20 
Wood and of wood 
and cork  
3.38*** 0.78 
28.71* 
[0.00] 
1.33*** 0.42 
4.21** 
[0.04] 
0.97* 0.96 
1.00 
[0.32] 
21t22 
Pulp, paper, printing  
and publishing  
2.31** 0.54 
6.77** 
[0.06] 
1.22* 0.12 - 0.72** - - 
23 
Coke, refined 
petroleum and nuclear 
fuel 
1.41* 0.43 
10.65* 
[0.00] 
0.93** -0.02 
0.68 
[0.61] 
0.55* -0.16 
0.01 
[0.94] 
24 
Chemicals and 
chemical products 
1.48** 0.31 
5.07** 
[0.06] 
2.63** 0.23 
2.45 
[0.12] 
- - - 
25 Rubber and plastics 0.85** 0.06 
1.77 
[0.21] 
0.62*** -0.03 
0.54 
[0.46] 
1.85* -2.66 
0.29 
[0.59] 
26 
Other non-metallic 
mineral  
0.91** 0.49 
17.17* 
[0.00] 
0.79* 0.35 
11.24* 
[0.00] 
0.88** 0.37 
0.00 
[0.99] 
27t28 
Basic metals and 
fabricated metal  
1.03* 0.43 
9.91* 
[0.01] 
0.71*** 0.20 
4.46** 
[0.03] 
- - - 
29 Machinery, nec  1.43* 0.12 
2.20 
[0.18] 
0.98* 0.02 
0.80 
[0.37] 
0.23* -0.66 
0.38 
[0.54] 
30t33 
Electrical and optical 
equipment  
1.18* 0.56 
20.28* 
[0.00] 
0.86** 0.38 
12.53* 
[0.00] 
2.27* 0.46 
0.46 
[0.50] 
34t35 Transport equipment  0.99** 0.53 
20.16* 
[0.00] 
0.86** 0.36 
15.18* 
[0.00] 
1.02** 0.53 
0.07 
[0.79] 
36t37 
Manufacturing, nec, 
recycling 
1.05*** 0.31 
8.68* 
[0.01] 
0.89* 0.21 
7.37* 
[0.01] 
- - - 
50 
Sale, maintenance and 
repair of motor 
vehicles and 
motorcycles; retail 
sale of fuel 
1.37* 0.55 
16.84* 
[0.00] 
0.81** 0.38 
11.89* 
[0.00] 
0.71** 0.58 
0.22 
[0.64] 
51 
Wholesale trade and 
commission trade, 
except of motor 
vehicles and 
motorcycles 
0.94* 0.27 
4.36** 
[0.07] 
0.68* 0.06 
1.62 
[0.20] 
0.68* 0.50 
1.55 
[0.21] 
52 
Retail trade, except of 
motor vehicles and 
motorcycles; repair of 
household goods 
0.99** 0.56 
24.15* 
[0.00] 
0.78* 0.40 
16.45* 
[0.00] 
0.68** 0.61 
2.16 
[0.14] 
60t63 Transport and storage  
1.00** 0.61 
34.50* 
[0.00] 
0.88** 0.41 
19.22* 
[0.00] 
1.23** 0.45 
2.26 
[0.13] 
64 
Post and 
telecommunications  
0.98* 0.47 
14.96* 
[0.00] 
0.86** 0.42 
18.85* 
[0.00] 
0.92*** 0.81 
1.78 
[0.18] 
70 Real estate activities 
2.15* 0.75 
47.84* 
[0.00] 
1.23* 0.45 
15.95* 
[0.00] 
1.52** 0.67 
1.20 
[0.27] 
71t74 
Renting of machinery 
& equipment and 
other business 
activities 
0.88* 0.28 
8.34* 
[0.01] 
0.79*** 0.16 
5.47** 
[0.02] 
- - - 
E 
Elecricity, Gas & 
Water Supply 
0.90*** 0.18 
3.57*** 
[0.09] 
0.74*** 0.06 
2.13 
[0.14] 
0.69* 0.01 
0.08 
[0.77] 
F Construction  
0.90** 0.20 
4.19** 
[0.06] 
0.68* 0.01 
1.17 
[0.28] 
0.69* -0.41 
0.10 
[0.75] 
H Hotels and restaurants  
0.72* 0.16 
3.29*** 
[0.10] 
0.75* 0.07 
2.36 
[0.12] 
0.58* -0.15 
1.09 
[0.30] 
J 
Financial 
intermediation  
0.97*** 0.24 
5.33 
[0.04] 
0.92* 0.09 
1.91 
[0.17] 
0.53* -0.36 
2.23 
[0.14] 
L 
Public administration 
and defence; 
compulsory social 
security  
1.08* 0.73 
76.63* 
[0.00] 
1.00** 0.63 
104.90* 
[0.00] 
0.83** 0.83 
4.48** 
[0.03] 
LtQ 
Community, social 
and personal services  
0.87* 0.48 
19.61* 
[0.00] 
0.74** 0.28 
10.15* 
[0.00] 
0.74* 0.62 
0.01 
[0.94] 
M Education  1.95** 0.50 24.36* 1.54* 0.43 33.66* 0.59* -0.08 0.48 
 36
[0.00] [0.00] [0.49] 
N 
Health and social 
work  
1.25** 0.60 
32.29* 
[0.00] 
1.20* 0.43 
22.86* 
[0.00] 
1.00* 0.67 
1.07 
[0.30] 
O 
Other community, 
social and personal 
services  
0.82*** 0.43 
22.05* 
[0.00] 
0.82** 0.24 
12.26* 
[0.00] 
0.57** -0.53 
0.06 
[0.81] 
P 
Private households 
with employed 
persons 
0.74** 0.17 
5.16** 
[0.03] 
0.83** 0.17 
7.87* 
[0.01] 
0.56*** -1.74 
0.03 
[0.87] 
Figures in square brackets are the reported p-values. Significant at *1%, **5% and ***10% respectively. Lerner Indexes are 
available upon request. “-” indicates that no data were available or estimates are statistical insignificant. Standard errors were 
computed by the delta method. For all the 2SLS regressions the Instrument Rank is bigger than the slope coefficients of the 
regression included constant.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EU-KLEMS database. 
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Table 5: Estimated mark up ratios* & degree of competition in Eurozone, US and 
Japan, 1970-2007     
  Eurozone US Japan 
ISIC Sector Mark-
up ratio 
Compe-
titive** 
Less 
compe-
titive***  
Mark-
up ratio 
Compe-
titive** 
Less 
compe-
titive***  
Mark-up 
ratio 
Compe-
titive** 
Less 
compe-
titive***  
D 
Total 
Manufacturing 
0.88** - - 0.94***   0.99**   
15t16 
Food, Beverages 
and Tobacco 
0.94**   0.97***   0.93***   
17t19 
Textile, Leather 
and Footwear 
0.53*   0.90** - - 0.81*   
20 
Wood and of wood 
and cork  
0.84**   0.85*   3.38***   
21t22 
Pulp, paper, 
printing  and 
publishing  
0.84***   0.91*** - - 2.31**   
23 
Coke, refined 
petroleum and 
nuclear fuel 
0.94*   1.16*   1.41* - - 
24 
Chemicals and 
chemical products 
0.96*   1.03* - - 1.48**   
25 Rubber and plastics 0.91*   0.93**   0.85**   
26 
Other non-metallic 
mineral  
0.86*   1.00**   0.91**   
27t28 
Basic metals and 
fabricated metal  
0.96**   0.82**   1.03* - - 
29 Machinery, nec  0.85**   0.92*   1.43* - - 
30t33 
Electrical and 
optical equipment  
0.86***   0.84*   1.18* - - 
34t35 
Transport 
equipment  
1.05**   0.85**   0.99**   
36t37 
Manufacturing, 
nec, recycling 
1.01*   1.11*   1.05*** - - 
50 
Sale, maintenance 
and repair of motor 
vehicles and 
motorcycles; retail 
sale of fuel 
0.98*   0.99**   1.37* - - 
51 
Wholesale trade 
and commission 
trade, except of 
motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
0.87*   0.93*   0.94*   
52 
Retail trade, except 
of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles; 
repair of household 
goods 
0.91* - - 0.90***   0.99**   
60t63 
Transport and 
storage  
0.70**   0.86*   1.00**   
64 
Post and 
telecommunications  
0.99* - - 0.90*   0.98*   
70 
Real estate 
activities 
0.96*   0.87* - - 2.15*   
71t74 
Renting of 
machinery & 
equipment and 
other business 
activities 
0.98*   0.94*   0.88*   
E 
Elecricity, Gas & 
Water Supply 
0.94**   0.91*   0.90***   
F Construction  0.82**   0.95**   0.90**   
H 
Hotels and 
restaurants  
1.11*   0.99*   0.72*   
J 
Financial 
intermediation  
0.95* - - 0.92*   0.97***   
L 
Public administrat-
ion and defence; 
compulsory social 
security  
0.99*   0.86*** - - 1.08*   
LtQ Community, social 1.08*   1.06**   0.87*   
 38
and personal 
services  
M Education  0.75** - - 1.03**   1.95**   
N 
Health and social 
work  
0.89**   1.06*   1.25**   
O 
Other community, 
social and personal 
services  
1.01*   1.01*   0.82***   
P 
Private households 
with employed 
persons 
- - - 0.98** - - 0.74**   
* Based on OLS Estimations. ** A competitive sector is defined when the estimated mark – up ratio is lower than unity by both 
OLS and Bootstrap methods of estimation or Bootstrap and 2SLS estimations move in the same direction (below unity). *** A 
less competitive sector is defined the estimated mark – up ratio is higher than unity by both OLS and Bootstrap methods of 
estimation or Bootstrap and 2SLS estimations move in the same direction (above unity). Dashes imply that the estimated mark – 
up ratio of Bootstrap method of estimation does not coincide with the corresponding ratios of OLS anf 2SLS methods of 
estimation.  
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